Non-interference (NI) is a property of systems stating that confidential actions should not cause effects observable by unauthorized users. Several variants of NI have been studied for many types of models but rarely for true concurrency or unbounded models. This work investigates NI for High-level Message Sequence Charts (HMSCs), a scenario language for the description of distributed systems, based on composition of partial orders. We first propose a general definition of security properties in terms of equivalence among observations of behaviors. Observations are naturally captured by partial order automata, a formalism that generalizes HMSCs and permits assembling partial orders. We show that equivalence or inclusion properties for HMSCs (and hence for partial order automata) are undecidable, which means in particular that NI is undecidable for HMSCs. We hence consider decidable subclasses of partial order automata and HMSCs. Finally, we define weaker local properties, describing situations where a system is attacked by a single agent, and show that local NI is decidable. We then refine local NI to a finer notion of causal NI that emphasizes causal dependencies between confidential actions and observations and extend it to causal NI with (selective) declassification of confidential events. Checking whether a system satisfies local and causal NI and their declassified variants are PSPACE-complete problems.
to nondeterministic models (transition systems, process algebra, Petri nets, etc.) and finer notions of observation (simple trace observation, deadlock or branching detection, etc.) to describe the various observational powers of an attacker. For a given system S, NI is usually defined as π V ( S\C ) ≈ π V ( S ), where ≈ denotes some behavioral system equivalence (language equivalence, bisimulation, etc.); S , the semantics of S; π V , the projection on a subset V of visible actions of the system; and S \ C, the model S from which all confidential actions from C are pruned. Intransitive non-interference (INI) relaxes NI to handle possible declassification of confidential actions. It ensures that confidential actions of a system cannot produce any effect visible by a public observer unless they are declassified, causing so a harmless information flow. This issue has been addressed in Rushby [1992] by comparing observations of visible actions in runs of a system (hence including runs containing nondeclassified confidential actions) and observations of visible actions in runs of the same system that only contain confidential actions that are declassified afterward. Most IFPs have been expressed as combinations of basic security predicates (BSPs) [Mantel 2000 [Mantel , 2001 ; D 'Souza et al. 2011] or as a behavioral equivalence under observation contexts [Focardi and Gorrieri 2001] . A systematic presentation of IFPs can be found, for example, in Mantel [2000 Mantel [ , 2001 and Focardi and Gorrieri [2001] .
Despite the fact that IFPs are always informally expressed in term of causality (i.e., confidential activity should not cause observable effects on the public behavior), they are almost always formalized in terms of interleaving semantics [Busi and Gorrieri 2009; Gorrieri and Vernali 2011; Best et al. 2010; Best and Darondeau 2012] and, hence, do not consider true concurrency or causality. This is clearly a lack in the formalization of IFPs for several reasons. First, from an algorithmic point of view, it is usually inefficient to compute a set of linearizations to address a problem that can be solved on an equivalent partial order representation. Second, a notion of interference based on equivalence that can distinguish between interleaved and concurrent sets of actions is more discriminating than a language-based interference property. Last, from a practical point of view, an attacker of a system may gain more information if he or she knows that some confidential action has occurred recently in its causal past. Indeed, transactions in a distributed system can leave many traces (visited websites, cookies, etc.) on machines that are not a priori committed to protect confidential actions of third parties. To the best of our knowledge, Baldan and Carraro [2014] were the first to address NI in a true concurrency setting: they characterized NI for Petri nets as a syntactic property of their unfoldings. However, the technique addresses only safe nets.
Very few results address IFPs for unbounded models. BSPs and NI are proved undecidable for pushdown systems, but decidability was obtained for small subclasses of context-free languages [D 'Souza et al. 2011] . Decidability of a bisimulation-based strengthened version of NI called nondeducibility on composition (NDC) for unbounded Petri nets is proved in Best et al. [2010] . A system satisfies NDC if observation of its visible actions remains indistinguishable from the observation of the system interacting with any environment. This result was extended in Best and Darondeau [2012] to INI with selective declassification (INISD).
Contribution. This work considers IFPs for an unbounded true concurrency model, namely, High-Level Message Sequence Charts (HMSCs). This model, standardized by the ITU [ITU-T 2011] , is well accepted to represent executions of distributed systems, where security problems are of primary concern. We first define a class of IFPs on HMSCs as an inclusion relation on observations, following Focardi and Gorrieri [2001] , D 'Souza et al. [2011] , and Bérard and Mullins [2014] . To keep IFPs within a true concurrency setting, observations of HMSCs are defined as partial orders. We define a new model called partial order automata (POA) that is powerful enough to recognize infinite sets of partial orders, and in particular observations of HMSCs. Unsurprisingly, most IFPs and the simple NI property are undecidable for HMSCs. As a consequence, inclusion of partial order automata languages is undecidable. We then characterize decidable subclasses of the problem: inclusion of sets of orders generated by POA becomes decidable when the depicted behaviors do not allow observed processes to race each other. This is, for instance, the case when a POA describes an observation of visible events located on a single process. This also applies when the observed HMSC is locally synchronized, meaning that within any iterated behavior, all processes synchronize at each iteration. We discuss the meaning of NI in a context where causal dependencies among event occurrences are considered. This leads to a new notion called causal interference for HMSCs. Causal interference detects interference as soon as an attacker can observe occurrences of confidential actions from visible events, and furthermore, one of the observed events causally depends on the confidential one. We finally relax causal interference in the context of declassification. We introduce intransitive causal non-interference that considers observable causal dependencies among confidential and visible events as safe as soon as a declassification occurs in between. We show that all local variants of these problems are PSPACE-complete.
Outline. The basic models and definitions used in this article are defined in Section 2. Observations, inclusion problems, and non-interference are introduced in Section 3 for a single scenario and in Section 4 for HMSCs, where NI is proved undecidable. Section 4 introduces partial order automata as a way to recognize observations of HMSCs. We identify subclasses of HMSCs and POA where inclusion problems become decidable in Section 5. Then we consider local variants of interference problems in Section 6 and extend this framework to declassification in Section 7. We compare this work with some related approaches and conclude in Section 8. Due to lack of space, several proofs are omitted or simply sketched but can be found in an extended version at hal.inria.fr/hal-01280043.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recall definitions of automata, partial orders, and HMSCs with their associated languages.
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are formal representations of distributed executions (i.e., chronograms) that are frequently used to depict the behavior of a set of asynchronous communicating processes. This simple graphical representation emphasizes messages and localization of actions with partial order semantics. The model of HMSCs, standardized by the ITU [ITU-T 2011] , was proposed to describe more elaborate behaviors of distributed systems, for instance, those of communication protocols, by combining MSCs. HMSCs are used to describe sets of typical scenarios in distributed systems and then serve as requirements. They can also be used as input to generate code skeletons for distributed systems. Hence, an information leak that appears in these early requirements is likely to be a feature of the final system. It is then interesting to find these leaks at early design stages. Another interesting point with HMSCs is their expressive power: they define behaviors of systems with asynchronous communications, which are not necessarily finite state systems and cannot be captured by finite automata. They are also uncomparable with Petri nets. Answering interference questions for HMSCs provides security techniques for a whole class of infinite systems that cannot be modeled with other formalisms.
Finite Automata and Partial Orders
Let be a finite alphabet. A word over is a sequence w = a 1 a 2 . . . a n of letters from , and * denotes the set of finite words over , with ε the empty word. A language is a subset L of * . For a set E, we write |E| for its cardinality. Given a relation R ⊆ E × E on E, we denote by R * the transitive and reflexive closure of R. A partial order on E is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation. Let f 1 and f 2 be two functions over disjoint domains Dom( f 1 ) and Dom( f 2 ). Then, f 1 ∪ f 2 denotes the function defined on Dom( f 1 ) ∪ Dom( f 2 ), which associates f 1 (x) with every x ∈ Dom( f 1 ) and f 2 (x) with every x ∈ Dom( f 2 ).
A Finite Automaton over alphabet is a tuple A = (S, δ, s 0 , F), where S is a finite set of states, s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, F ⊆ S is a set of accepting states, and δ ⊆ S × × S is a transition relation. A word w = a 1 . . . a n ∈ * is accepted by A if there exists a sequence of transitions (s 0 , a 1 , s 1 )(s 1 , a 2 , s 2 ) . . . (s n−1 , a n , s n ) such that s n ∈ F. It is well known that finite automata accept regular languages.
A Labeled Partial Order (LPO) over alphabet is a triple O = (E, ≤, α), where (E, ≤) is a partially ordered set (poset) and α : E → is a labeling of E by letters of . The set of all LPOs over alphabet is denoted by LPO( ). For a subset of events E ⊆ E,
, where α |E is the restriction of α to E . The set of predecessors of E is ↓ (E ) = { f ∈ E | f ≤ e for some e ∈ E } and the set of successors of E is ↑ (E ) = { f ∈ E | e ≤ f for some e ∈ E }. The set E is downward closed if ↓ (E ) = E and upward closed if ↑ (E ) = E . A linear extension of an LPO O = (E, ≤, α) with |E| = n is a sequence r = e 1 e 2 . . . e n of all events of E such that for every j > k, e j e k . Linear extensions describe compatible sequences of events with the partial ordering. The size of LPO O, denoted by |O|, is |E|.
there exists an injective mapping h : E 1 → E 2 such that α 2 (h(e)) = α 1 (e) for all e ∈ E 1 , h(E 1 ) is downward closed, and e 1 ≤ 1 f 1 if and only if h(e 1 ) ≤ 2 h( f 1 ).
A set of partial orders Y contains another set of partial orders X, denoted by X ⊆ Y , if for every x ∈ X, there exists y ∈ Y such that x ≡ y. We will write X ≡ Y if X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X. We say that X embeds into Y , denoted X Y if and only if for every x ∈ X, there exists y ∈ Y such that x y. Given an LPO O = (E, ≤, α), the covering of O is a triple (E, ≺, α), where ≺ is the transitive and reflexive reduction of ≤, that is, the smallest subset of E × E such that ≺ * =≤. Since two orders are isomorphic if and only if their coverings are isomorphic, we often consider covering relations instead of orders in the rest of the article. A causal chain in an LPO is a sequence of events e 1 e 2 . . . e k such that e i ≺ e i+1 .
Figure 1 (left) shows an example of LPO, with set of events E = {e i | 1 ≤ i ≤ 7} and labels in {a, b, h}. A possible linear extension of this LPO is e 1 e 3 e 5 e 2 e 4 e 7 e 6 , which corresponds to the word aahbbba. Sequences of events e 1 e 5 e 6 , e 1 e 3 e 6 , and e 2 e 4 e 7 are causal chains of the LPO. Figure 1 (middle) is a covering of this LPO, and Figure 1 (right) is its restriction to E = {e 1 , e 2 , e 5 , e 6 }. As E is upward closed, the order at the right of the figure is also a prefix of the leftmost order. 
High-Level Message Sequence Charts
Definition 2.1 (MSC). A Message Sequence Chart over finite sets P of processes, M of messages, and finite alphabet A is a tuple M = (E, (≤ p ) p∈P , α, μ, φ), where:
• E is a finite set of events, partitioned as E = E S E R E I , according to the type of event considered: message sending, reception, or internal atomic action, that is, local events to a process that are not participating in communication.
• φ : E → P is a mapping associating with each event the process that executes it.
Hence, the sets E p = φ −1 ({ p}) for p ∈ P also form a partition of E.
• For each p ∈ P, the relation ≤ p ⊆ E p × E p is a total ordering on events located on process p.
• μ ⊆ E S × E R is a relation symbolizing message exchanges, such that if (e, f ) ∈ μ with e ∈ E p and f ∈ E q , then p = q. Furthermore, it induces a bijection from E S onto E R , so with a slight abuse of notation, (e, f ) ∈ μ is also written as f = μ(e). The relation
• α is a mapping from E to = (P × {!, ?} × P × M) ∪ (P × A) and from μ to M, associating a label with each event, and a message α(e, f ) in M with each pair (e, f ) ∈ μ. The labeling is consistent with μ: if f = μ(e), with associated message α(e, f ) = m, is sent by process p to process q, then α(e) is written as p!q(m) and α( f ) as q? p(m). If e is an internal action a located on process p, then α(e) is of the form p(a). Summarizing, may be written as
The labeling is extended by morphism over E * .
As depicted in Figure 2 , we symbolize local events by bullets and communicating events as the source and target of arrows labeled by a message name. The previous definition implies that the triple (E, ≤ M , α) is an LPO over ; hence, all notions related to posets also apply to MSCs. When clear from the context, we simply write ≤ instead of ≤ M . Given a subset E of E, we denote by M |E the restriction of M to E (associated with the corresponding LPO restriction) and we denote by M \ E the restriction of M to E \ E . We denote by Msc(P, M, A) the set of all MSCs over the sets P of processes, M of messages, and alphabet A. Definition 2.2. A linearization of MSC M is a word w ∈ * such that there exists a linear extension r of M with w = α(r). The language L(M) of M is the set of linearizations of M.
The language of an MSC is hence a set of words over alphabet . To design more elaborate behaviors, including choices and iterations, a key ingredient is sequential composition, which assembles MSCs process-wise to form larger MSCs. 
In Figure 2 Definition 2.4 (HMSC). An HMSC is a tuple H = (N, →, M, n 0 , F), where N is a set of nodes, M is a finite set of MSCs, →⊆ N × M × N is a transition relation, n 0 ∈ N is the initial node, and F is a set of accepting nodes.
As for any kind of automaton, paths and languages can be defined for HMSCs. A path of H is a sequence ρ = t 1 t 2 . . . t k such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, t i = (n i , M i , n i ) is a transition in →, with n i = n i+1 for each i ≤ k − 1. The path ρ is a cycle if n k = n 1 . It is accepting if it starts from node n 0 (i.e., n 1 = n 0 ), and it terminates in a node of F (n k ∈ F). Definition 2.5. Let ρ = t 1 t 2 . . . t k be a path of an HMSC H. The MSC associated with
More intuitively, the MSC associated with a path is obtained by concatenating MSCs encountered along this path after renaming the events to obtain disjoint sets of events. To simplify notation, we often drop the isomorphisms used to rename events, writing
With this automaton structure and the sequential composition of MSCs, an HMSC H defines a set of accepting paths, denoted by P H ; a set of MSCs F H = {M ρ | ρ ∈ P H }; and a set of words obtained as the linearization Figure 3 shows an example of an HMSC, with transitions labeled by four MSCs
shown at the right of the figure is an example of an MSC generated by H. It is well known that the linearization language of an HMSC is not necessarily regular, but rather a closure of a regular language under partial commutation, which yields many undecidability results (see, for instance, Muscholl and Peled [1999] and Caillaud et al. [2000] •k on q and r have to be executed (and in particular receptions of sent messages). Hence, there is a race between p and q, r due to this cycle, and the linearization language of H is not regular.
OBSERVATION AND NON-INTERFERENCE FOR MSCS
The power of an external observer can be described by an observation function, mapping every behavior of a system to some observables. In Mantel [2000 Mantel [ , 2001 and D 'Souza et al. [2011] , observation functions are seen as specific language theoretic operations (projection, morphism, insertion, deletion of letters, etc.), and in Bérard and Mullins [2014] , they are combinations of rational operations (transductions, intersections, unions of languages).
In a distributed context, visible events can originate from different processes. In a distributed and asynchronous setting, the date at which an event is observed provides a linear ordering of observed events. However, this linear ordering does not necessarily correspond to an actual execution: two concurrent processes may execute events concurrently, or conversely, there might be some causal dependencies among observed events. This information on action dependencies might be available to observers: if the system is equipped with vector clocks (vectors maintained by each process to count the known number of events that other processes have executed, as proposed in Mattern [1988] ), one can also record causality in observations of a system. Hence, the natural and realistic notion of observation for distributed computations is a labeled partial order, where events that are not causally dependent are considered concurrent.
Observations for MSCs
Definition 3.1. An observation function is a mapping from Msc(P, M, A) to LPO(B) for some alphabet B.
From this definition, any mapping from MSCs to LPOs can be called an observation. However, some observation functions are natural when considering IFPs. As proposed in Mantel [2001] with the notion of views, the alphabet labeling events that occur during an execution of a system can be partitioned as = V C N with visible, confidential, and internal (neutral) labels. Actions with labels in V can be observed, while actions labeled in C are confidential and should be hidden. Internal actions have labels in N and are not observable a priori, but need not be kept secret. Subsequently, depending on their labels, events are also called visible, confidential, or internal events.
Various observation functions can be defined from such a partition. The most natural ones are restrictions to visible events and pruning of confidential actions, which are standard operations in language-based non-interference literature but need to be precisely defined in a partial order setting. Let M = (E, (≤ p ) p∈P , α, μ, φ) be an MSC with labeling alphabet . We consider the following observation functions:
• identity: the identity id(M) = M outputs the same LPO as the executed MSC.
represents the visible events and their causal dependencies that one may observe during the complete execution of M. Note that restriction to α −1 (V ) suffices, as ≤ is transitive.
) is a function that prunes out the future of confidential events from M, leaving only the visible events and their causal dependencies, observed when no confidential event, nor their future, is executed within M.
, for a given process p ∈ P, is the observation of visible events of M restricted to those events located on process p. Note that O p (M) is a total order. In a distributed setting, O p (M) is particularly interesting, as it represents the point of view of a single process p ∈ P, considered as the attacker of the system. We hence assume no restriction on the set of events that can be executed and observed by p, and let V = p = α(E p ) when using O p .
Non-interference for MSCs
As noticed by D 'Souza et al. [2011] in a language setting, information flow properties of a system S are usually defined as compositions of atomic propositions of the form op 1 (S) ⊆ op 2 (S). Changing the observation functions op 1 , op 2 (or the partition of ) leads to a variety of such atomic properties. Information flow properties of MSCs can be defined similarly.
Very often, interference is informally described as causal dependencies between confidential actions and observable ones, but formalized in terms of languages comparison, that is, with interleaved representations that miss information on concurrency and causality. Consider, for instance, the basic HMSC of Figure 4 . It generates only two MSCs: M high and M low . Now assume that an attacker of the system can only observe actions a and b, that action h is a confidential action, and that all other events are unobservable. In an interleaving setting, the attacker may observe words ab and ba, no matter whether h occurs or not; hence, the system does not leak information. Now, if an attacker has the capability to observe a, b and their causal dependencies, then observing that a precedes b reveals the occurrence of h. So, in a setting where causal dependencies can be observed, the system leaks information. For a single MSC M, the notion of non-interference is defined as a comparison of partial orders:
We now show that interference in a single MSC can be characterized in terms of causal dependencies from confidential events in C to visible ones in V . We then show in Section 3.3 that checking the existence of such dependencies can be performed via coloring of events. This result will be used to define interference in terms of MSC coloring and also to prove that this coloring is compositional.
Interference Detection by Coloring
The relation between causal dependencies and interference calls for a graphical interpretation of interference in MSCs, represented as a propagation of a black token inherited from confidential actions along causal dependencies. Intuitively, any confidential action and successors of actions marked with a black token are also marked with a black token and every process containing a black action is also marked as black. This black-and-white coloring representation of MSCs will be conveniently used later to detect information flows in HMSCs.
Definition 3.5 (MSC and Process Coloring). Let M be an MSC over an alphabet = C V N and a set of events E. An event e ∈ E is black if α(↓ (e)) ∩ C = ∅, and white otherwise. A process p ∈ P is black after M (white after M, respectively) if there exists a black event located on p (no black event on p, respectively). Figure 5 shows a coloring of an MSC M bw in black and white. The alphabet of confidential actions is C = {q(c)}; that is, it contains an atomic action c executed by process q. We attach a black token to every black event and a white token to other events. Similarly, we indicate with a black/white token below process lines whether a process has met a black token during its execution. Intuitively, a black process can detect occurrences of confidential events, as it executes events that are causal consequences of confidential events. In this example, process p can detect occurrences of c (it is black after M bw ), but process s cannot.
In this coloring setting, interference has an obvious operational meaning: an MSC is interferent if and only if it contains a visible black event. The MSC M bw depicted in Figure 5 is interferent as p?r(m 7 ) ∈ V . Hence, deciding if an MSC is interferent reduces to searching a path from a confidential event to a visible one in an acyclic graph where events are seen as vertices and pairs of events (e, f ) in (∪ p∈P ≤ p ) ∪ μ as edges. Since an event has at most two immediate successors, the graph to consider has at most n = |E M | vertices and 2 · n edges. Hence, interference detection in an MSC can be performed in linear time as a graph exploration starting from confidential events. Another interesting property is that deciding the black/white status of a process after a sequence of MSCs of arbitrary size can be performed in bounded memory. This important property means that it is sufficient to remember the black/white status of each process after concatenation M 1 • · · · • M k along a path of an HMSC to compute the status of process p after concatenation
OBSERVATIONS ON HMSCS AS PARTIAL ORDER AUTOMATA
In this section, we first discuss extending observation functions from MSCs to HMSCs and show that the inclusion problem and non-interference are undecidable for HMSCs. We also remark that some observation functions on HMSCs can be obtained by assembling partial orders obtained by observation of MSCs encountered along a path, but with composition operators that are more powerful than sequential composition of MSCs. This suggests the definition of POA that are finite automata where transitions are labeled by LPOs. To increase the expressive power of this model, we introduce various ways of assembling the partial orders appearing along paths through composition operators and selection functions. The main purpose of this section is to present the material needed in Section 5 where we prove that non-interference is decidable for the subclass of locally synchronized HMSCs. This result is obtained by (1) building two partial order automata A H,O 1 and A H,O 2 associated with a locally synchronized HMSC H, respectively accepting observations O 1 (H) and O 2 (H), and (2) proving that in this case, the inclusion problem O 1 (H) ⊆ O 2 (H) is decidable. In this section, we mainly identify sufficient conditions on the observation functions to achieve point (1) earlier, while decidability is proved in the next section.
Extending Observations to HMSCs
In order to extend an observation O to an HMSC H, a first way consists in applying
Extending Definitions 3.2 and 3.3 to HMSCs, we have:
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• (H) contains in addition a second LPO with two events labeled a and b such that a < b. Unfortunately, the previous observation functions do not take into account the structure of the HMSC generating F H , and furthermore, they are not necessarily compositional. In general, an observation function O is not a morphism with respect to the concatenation, that is,
. This drawback was already observed in Genest et al. [2003] for projections of MSCs: in general,
is an LPO in which the event carrying label c 1 precedes the event carrying label b. This causal dependency does not exist in
. Hence, checking inclusion for HMSCs may require considering properties of complete sequences of MSCs as a whole, raising algorithmic difficulties, or even undecidability. Other ways to extend observations to HMSCs are to assemble observations of MSCs piecewise, following the automaton structure of HMSCs, or to forbid MSCs containing confidential events: 
The difference between observation functions is illustrated on the MSC obtained from H in Figure 3 (right), with V = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i} as alphabet of visible events. Figure 6 . The observation covering for the same path in O V,• (H) is obtained from this diagram by removing the dashed dependencies from e 8 to e 6 and from e 3 to e 10 and to e 6 . This example clearly shows that concatenation of projections of MSCs and projections of concatenations of MSCs differ. In our example, this mainly comes from the fact that dependencies stemming from message m in M 2 and messages m, n in M 4 are lost during projection. Observation O p,• (M) is simply the restriction of this order to e 7 , e 8 , e 9 , e 10 .
Even when a projection of an HMSC is an HMSC language (i.e., a language recognizable by an HMSC), equivalence, inclusion, or emptiness of intersection is undecidable. HMSC languages are not always regular and the observation of an HMSC need not be regular either. In fact, due to the close relationship between HMSCs and Mazurkiewicz traces, most properties requiring one to compare languages or partial order families are undecidable for HMSCs [Caillaud et al. 2000; Peled 1999, 2000] . So, given two HMSCs H 1 and PROOF. The proof is a reduction from the inclusion problem for partial order families generated by HMSCs. For two HMSCs H 1 and H 2 , the question of whether F H 1 ⊆ F H 2 is undecidable [Caillaud et al. 2000] .
Let
2 ) be two HMSCs, defined over an alphabet of visible actions V , and with a set P containing at least two processes. We build an HMSC H that behaves like H 1 or H 2 if a confidential action can occur, and like H 2 otherwise, and choose observation functions
Let c be a new confidential action and P c ∈ P a new process. We define M c as the MSC containing the single atomic action c on process P c , as illustrated in Figure 7 (middle).
Note that the undecidability of inclusion problems is not due to a particular choice of observation function: a similar proof is obtained for
\C , by replacing M c by an MSC M c in which process P c sends a message to all other processes after performing action c, as depicted on the right of Figure 7 .
This result extends to non-interference properties:
COROLLARY 4.3. Non-interference for HMSCs is undecidable.
PROOF. Consider again the example HMSC H built in the proof of Theorem 4.2 (and shown in Figure 7 ). Recall that observable events are those in H 1 and H 2 , while the only confidential event in H is the one labeled by c. 
Partial Order Automata
While HMSCs assemble finite MSCs to produce larger MSCs (i.e. particular LPOs), inclusion and interference properties do not compare MSCs but observations of MSCs. As mentioned earlier, projections of HMSCs are not in general HMSCs [Genest et al. 2003 ]; hence, observations of HMSCs are not HMSCs either. To compare the orderings (or their coverings) obtained by observation of a set of MSCs, we need more general structures. We propose in this section a model called Partial Order Automata, which assembles partial orders (or their coverings). Partial order automata are automata labeled by finite orders, and at each transition, the way to assemble the labeling order depends on a gluing operator attached to this transition, and on a set of memorized events. This model is more general than HMSCs, where the gluing operator is the same (sequential composition • ) for every transition. However, in this article, we will not use the whole expressive power of partial order automata, and we will only use POA to define projections of partial order families generated by HMSCs. Yet, we need a model that is more expressive than HMSCs: as explained earlier, the observation of a sequential composition of MSC differs from the sequential composition of their projections. A selection function is a function associating with a partial order
Definition 4.4 (Composition Operator). A composition operator for partial orders is an operator
, where h is the injective mapping between the sets of events proving
Selection functions are used to memorize events of interest during the construction of a covering relation by a partial order automaton. Intuitively, given two coverings
and ≺ is a covering relation that contains ≺ 1 ∪ ≺ 2 and such that ≺ \(≺ 1 ∪ ≺ 2 ) ⊆ Mem 1 × E 2 (the operator only glues events from the selection and events from the newly added order). Let us consider a monotonic selection function and a sequence of composition operations. Slightly abusing our notation, we write
and similarly for sequences of compositions, we write
and leave the selection process implicit. For monotonic selection functions, remembering previously memorized events suffices to compute a new memory. We can hence safely write (Mem ⊗ O) to define the set of events memorized after concatenation of O to any order O such that (O ) = Mem.
In the rest of the article, we consider composition operators that assemble multiple copies from a finite set of orders, that is, compositions of the form
where each O i is a copy from a finite set of LPOs L, and ⊗ 1 , · · · ⊗ k−1 are composition operators. To distinguish multiple copies of an order and of its events, we denote by 
One can notice that MaxEvt is monotonic and returns a finite set of events regardless of the size of the considered sequence of compositions.
Example 4.6. Consider the example of Figure 8 . Let us define a selection function a that remembers the maximal occurrences of events carrying label a that are maximal with respect to the ordering, and a composition operator ⊗ a that merges an order by creating dependencies from all memorized events to minimal events of the appended order. The figure shows two orders O 1 , O 2 , the set of events kept in memory (in dashed parts), and the assembled order O 1 ⊗ a O 2 .
Definition 4.7. A POA over a finite set OPS of composition operators is a tuple
, where Q is a finite set of states, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, F ⊆ Q is a set of final states, L is a finite set of LPOs, −→⊆ Q × L × Q is a set of transitions, is a mapping associating with each transition an operator from OPS, and is a monotonic selection function. The transition relation is deterministic: for each L ∈ L and each q ∈ Q, there is at most one q ∈ Q such that (q, L, q ) ∈−→.
For every path ρ
For readability, we often omit the specific operators used to assemble orders and simply write
For two events e and f , we write e ≤ ρ f when e precedes f in the partial order O ρ . The partial order language of a POA A is the set of orders obtained by assembling orders along accepting paths of A and is denoted by F A . The linearization language of A is the set of linearizations of orders in F A .
Consider the POA A depicted in Figure 9 over the set of orders L = {O 1 , O 2 }. We choose a selection function that remembers all maximal events in the order generated so far, and we let ⊗ 1 = (n 0 , O 1 , n 1 ) be the operator that glues minimal events of the appended order to the maximal events formerly memorized, and ⊗ 2 = (n 1 , O 2 , n 0 ) be the operator that creates a precedence relation from every event memorized with label α to the minimal events with label α in the appended order. With these operators, our POA generates, for instance, the order
shown at the right of the figure.
First note that deterministic finite automata are particular cases of POA where each order labeling a transition is reduced to a single event, and the only operator involved is the standard concatenation on words. As mentioned earlier, HMSCs can also be seen as 
Threaded and Locally Synchronized Partial Order Automata
Most formal properties of HMSCs are undecidable, and NI is no exception. However, decidable subclasses of HMSCs have been identified. Locally synchronized HMSCs have regular linearization languages [Alur and Yannakakis 1999] . Hence, inclusion of a regular language and comparison of HMSC linearizations are decidable problems for locally synchronized HMSCs. It is then reasonable to consider a similar approach for partial order automata and identify subclasses on which comparison of covering relations is decidable. One of the factors that yields decidability in HMSCs is very often the fact that orderings are organized as processes. We cannot have similar notions of processes in partial order automata that only assemble occurrences of labeled events. However, we can use the fact that orders in F A are generated as compositions from a finite set of patterns to characterize subclasses of partial order automata where events can be grouped and ordered according to common characteristics and generate orders with cliques of bounded width.
Definition 4.9 (Threaded POA). A partial order automaton is threaded if for every path ρ of A containing at least two occurrences of some order O = (E, ≤, α) and every event e ∈ E, we have e (i) < ρ e (i+1) for any two consecutive occurrences of O.
The intuition behind threaded POA is that in orders generated by a threaded POA A, the size of cliques (sets of concurrent events) is bounded by a factor of the size of the alphabet labeling events. This allows one to organize orders of F A in threads, in a similar way as events are localized on processes in HMSCs. This property is essential to be able to decide, for instance, isomorphism of partial order families, as it bounds the degree of the covering relation (an event can only have a bounded number of successors). Consider the example of Figure 9 . Clearly, due to the use of operator ⊗ 2 that creates a "synchronization barrier", every occurrence e i of some event e in O 1 or O 2 precedes the next occurrence e i+1 of the same event in any order O ρ associated with a path ρ of A. One can notice that the composition operator • of HMSCs immediately grants threaded partial order automata, as MSCs are composed process-wise, and hence two successive occurrences of the same event in two occurrences of an MSC are necessarily ordered. 
t , and due to properties of elementary sequences, we have g
t . Now, as the selection function recalls the last occurrences of events and uses the same operators that depend only on chosen transitions, we will have g 2) . Similar reasoning holds when inserting several occurrences of elementary sequences between two occurrences of O 1 . As all paths containing two consecutive occurrences of some order can only be obtained by such insertions, this allows one to conclude that ρ is threaded, which contradicts our starting hypothesis. Hence, A is threaded if and only if all its elementary sequences are threaded. Now, let us consider the complexity part. Finding an acyclic path ρ containing twice a transition (q 1 , O, q 2 ) can be done non-deterministically in polynomial time, by choosing non-deterministically a path starting from q 2 , and stopping as soon as some transition was already encountered, or when reaching the second occurrence of transition (q 1 , O, q 2 ). Followed paths are of length at most | −→ |. Appending an order to an existing one and maintaining a set of selected events can be done in polynomial time, as it suffices to add a bounded number of elements (events and covering relation). Denoting by m the maximal size of an order in L, each step hence adds at most m events and |L| × m 2 elements to the covering relation built so far. For a chosen event e, one can maintain during construction of the order a set S of at most |L|.m events that are both in the set of events kept by the selection function, and successors of e. Then, if one ends with a second occurrence of (q 1 , O, q 2 ), it is easy to check that e (2) is a successor of some event of S.
Our overall objective when defining POA is to provide tools to compare partial order families, and in particular HMSC projections. It is well known that locally synchronized HMSCs have regular linearization languages, and as a consequence, many properties are decidable for this subclass of HMSCs. Note, however, that most of the results provided for HMSC rely on properties of their linearizations. When an HMSC has a regular linearization language, the language of its projection onto a subset of events is also regular. However, as shown in the example of Figure 4 , considering linearizations of a system is not always sufficient to characterize information leaks. We will hence rely on a subset of POA that has a regular linearization language, but more interestingly, for which isomorphism of generated partial order families is decidable. Being threaded is not a sufficient condition for a POA to define a regular language. Inspired by the class of locally synchronized HMSCs, we define an appropriate syntactic class of POA that has regular languages. Locally synchronized HMSCs rely on properties of communication among processes in cycles. POA do not possess this notion of process, but in threaded POA, ordering among events of the same kind replaces this total ordering among events located on the same process. We hence rely on properties of a commutation graph (instead of communication graphs in HMSCs) to define locally synchronized POA.
Definition 4.11. Let O = (E, ≤, α) be a partial order, and ρ be a path such that O = O ρ . The commutation graph of ρ is a graph CG(ρ) = (E, ) where (e, f ) ∈ if and only if
(the first occurrence of e precedes the next occurrence of f ).
A POA A is locally synchronized if it is threaded, and for each cycle ρ of A, CG(ρ) is strongly connected.
Consider again the example of Figure 9 . We already know that this POA is threaded. Furthermore, the synchronization barrier imposed by operator ⊗ 2 guarantees that every occurrence of an event e in O 1 ⊗ O 2 either precedes the occurrence of an event f in O 1 ⊗ O 2 (this is, for instance, the case for events e 1 , e 2 in the example at the right of the figure) or precedes the next occurrence of this event (this is, for instance, the case for events e 1 and e 9 in the example). This property applies for any pair of events and also for order O 2 ⊗ O 1 , so the POA of Figure 9 is locally synchronized.
THEOREM 4.12. Let A be a threaded POA with a selection function that memorizes a bounded number K of events. Then one can effectively decide if A is locally synchronized.
PROOF (SKETCH). The existence of disconnected communication graphs can be proved on cycles that contain at most one occurrence of each transition. Indeed, for a selected pair of events e, f in such cycles, as considered automata are threaded, insertion of another elementary cycle simply extends the length of causal chains and does not change connectedness of e (1) ,
. It then suffices to detect these cycles, build their commutation graph, and check that these graphs are connected.
Finitely Decomposable Observation Functions
So far, we have identified a class of threaded and locally synchronized POA, that appear as good candidates to represent some observations of locally synchronized HMSCs. It then remains to show that this is the case. For this, we proceed in two steps: we first define properties of observations functions that guarantee that observation of families of MSCS obtained by sequential composition from a predetermined set of MSCs M can be effectively represented by POA. Namely, we require the observation of orders in M • * to be expressible as compositions of observations of MSCs from M with a finite set of operators, and we require existence of a function that can choose the right operator to assemble orders at each moment of the sequence. A second step then shows that POAs can recognize finitely decomposable observations of HMSCs. 
Decomposability of an observation function w.r.t. to a set of MSCs guarantees that the set of operations needed to assemble the observations of two MSCs and obtain the observation of the concatenation of these MSC is finite, and that the operation to apply only depends on the order observed so far. This is a first step toward some form of compositionality for observations. This is, however, not sufficient to build incrementally an observation of an HMSC, as one may still need unbounded memory to assemble two observations. 
is regular, that is, there exists a deterministic finite state machine B that reads sequences of MSCs and associates an operator with every state.
(the memorized events are sufficient to build the ordering from events in O 1 ..
Intuitively, for finitely decomposable observation functions with memorization function , this function keeps in memory only a bounded number of events that need to be used later along the observation of a sequence, and the computation of the memory is compositional, in the sense that it removes useless events from memory at previous steps and adds new events that will be used later. 
t. M), one can build a POA A H,O that recognizes O(H).

PROOF. For a given HMSC
OPS is the set of operators used by the finitely decomposable observation function O. We set −→ as the set of triples of the form ((n, op), O(M), (n , op )) such that (n, M, n ) ∈−→ and there exists a path ρ = n 0
As is regular, −→ is finite and can be built inductively. Last, : Q × O(M) × Q → OPS associates operator op with every transition t = ((n, op), O(M), (n , op )) ∈−→ , and ((n 0 , O i , n )) = id; that is, an observation starting from the initial node of the HMSC simply copies the observation of the first MSC recognized from the initial node of H. PROOF (SKETCH). We build this proof on the result of Genest et al. [2003] , who show that projections of HMSCs can be recognized by finite partial order automata. These automata memorize events that can still have a successor in the projected covering relation and use a single composition operator that connects the projection of a newly observed MSC to memorized events (whence finite decomposability of the function that associates an operator to sequences of MSCs). As the set of events to memorize is always finite, as shown in Genest et al. [2003] A consequence of this proposition is that one can build partial order automata that
One can also notice that automata that recognize projections of HMSCs are threaded, since with the composition operators used, the n th event on a process necessarily precedes the n+ 1 th event on the same process. Now, this does not mean that inclusion properties are decidable. We have to consider subclasses of partial order automata and then check that observations fall into these subclasses.
INTERFERENCE DETECTION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we prove that non-interference is decidable for locally synchronized HMSCs. To check an inclusion problem for an HMSC H and subsequently check noninterference, one needs to compare runs in , as in the definition of prefix in Section 2). Notice that there can be several runs of A O 2 ,H (possibly an infinite number of them) that are compatible with a chosen run ρ 1 . However, as soon as partial order automata are threaded, we can give a finite representation for sets of runs that comply with a finite order.
Minimal Explanations and Unfoldings of POA
One important fact with HMSCs is that if a run is compatible with a given observation, then extending this run with an additional transition still produces a compatible run. Similarly, one can consider cycles that have no observable effect as implicit. These properties still hold for threaded POA and can be used to find minimal and finite sets of explanations. 
Considering shortest paths is one essential requirement to have a finite representation for the set of paths of A that have a particular order O as prefix. Hence, if O is already a prefix of O ρ , we do not consider paths of the form ρ.ρ . This is, however, not sufficient to obtain a finite representation of paths embedding O: a set of minimal explanations can still be infinite. Indeed, consider an order O with only two events a ≤ a . Then O could be a prefix of any order of the form O 1 (⊗ O 2 ) k ⊗ O 3 , where O 1 contains a, O 3 contains a , and O 2 contains only events that are not causally related to occurrences of a or a . However, such iterations can be handled. We reuse ideas from Hélouët et al. [2014] where a finite unfolding of an HMSC is built to perform diagnosis from a partial order observation, and an abstraction technique introduced in Alur and Yannakakis [1999] to represent finitely sequences of MSCs that are partially executed. Let us first build a finite representation for this set of paths.
Starting from POA A = (Q, −→, L, q 0 , F, , ) and LPO O, we build inductively a POA B, where states and transitions are obtained by unfolding A, and remembering after each transition the part of O that is a prefix of a path ending in this state and the memorized events. States are hence of the form (q, Mem q , E q , ), where q is a state of A, Mem q is a description of memorized events (a subset containing events from Mem-the initial memory contents-and newly generated events), and E q is a subset of events of E O . There is a transition from (q, Mem q , E q ,) to (q , Mem q , E q ) labeled by O i if and only if there exists a transition (q, O i , q ) in A, and:
and
• E q is the maximal subset of events of E O that contains E q and such that
Intuitively, appending O i to already built paths allows us to embed a larger part of O in the recognized order. We define ((q, Mem, E) 
During this construction, we may create loops that do not change the recognized part of O, nor the memory contents. States of the form (q, Mem q , E O ) have no successor (O is a prefix of orders generated along all paths ending in this state) and are called final states. The construction can be performed inductively and stops when no new state is discovered. If the memory selection function of A memorizes only a finite number of events, and if A is threaded (which guarantees that the set of paths of A to explore to find the next occurrence of some action is bounded), then this construction terminates, and for every O ∈ F B , O O .
We can then extract from B a finite set of sequential representations for the minimal explanations of O as follows: it is the set of acyclic paths from q 0 to a final state, decorated with connected components for which transitions do not change the memory contents nor the part of O discovered so far. We call these transitions silent transitions: they are labeled by orders with events that might appear in larger orders containing O but are not mandatory to find a path ρ such that O O ρ . Similarly, one can find minimal explanations from any state q starting with an already recognized order O and memory contents Mem.
As A is threaded, for every transition As proposed in Alur and Yannakakis [1999] , we can go further and memorize only subsequences of each path that contain incomplete transitions and the connection between these subsequences. Let B i be the automaton associated with an explanation as earlier, and suppose that it starts with a single transition t = (q, O 1 , q ) (i.e., its initial state is not attached to a silent strongly connected component) such that events of t are all marked. Then O ⊗ O n+1 is a prefix of some order generated by A 2 if and only if O ⊗ O n+1 \h i (E O 1 ) is a prefix of B i \ {t} with initial state q . Hence, one can safely forget initial transitions that are all marked. Last, O ⊗ O n+1 is a prefix of some order generated by A 2 if and only if O n+1 is a prefix of the projection of some O ρ where ρ is a path of some B i on its unmarked events. This means that one can simply memorize incompletely marked transitions, silent connected components, and final states of all B i s and still check that appending a particular order O n+1 preserves the inclusion proved so far. Starting from an explanation ρ 2,i , we denote by Prune(ρ 2,i ) the sequence of incompletely marked transitions and connected components obtained from ρ 2,i . As extension of an explanation only uses connected components or appends orders at the end of the explanation, one can compute a new explanation from a pruned explanation. For an explanation ρ proving that an order O is a prefix of some order of A 2 , we denote by Succ(ρ, O n ) the set of explanations obtained this way for
This immediately gives the idea of Algorithm 1 to compare two partial order automata A 1 and A 2 . The algorithm follows paths of A 1 by remembering a set of selected events in memory and the last state visited in A 1 , and on the other side, it maintains a set of pruned explanations of A 2 that are compatible with the followed paths. At each step of the construction, when choosing a new transition t = (q, O n , q ) from A 1 (i.e., extending some path ρ 1 ), we ensure that O ρ 1 .t is a prefix of an order for at least one explanation. Note, however, that pruning does not guarantee finiteness of the memorized information in general. The algorithm returns false if it can find a path ρ 1 that has no explanation in A 2 and true if all possible configurations have been explored.
The set of configurations to explore can grow arbitrarily, and nothing guarantees that the algorithm terminates in general. However, locally synchronized POA produce only regular sets of linearizations and describe behaviors in which no process can repeat a behavior, that is, iterate a behavior described in a cycle of the POA, as long as the preceding occurrence of this cycle is not terminated by other contributing processes.
ALGORITHM 1: Checking Inclusion Input: Two partial order automata,
// Configurations remember a path of A 1 and several compatible paths // of A 2 with information on how events of A 2 are used for embedding X 0 := ((q 1 0 , ε), ∅); // We start from the initial node of A 1 and an empty set // of paths of A 2 . Xplore := {X 0 };
// choose a particular configuration: a node of A 1 , and a partial // description of all paths of A 2 compatible with the chosen runof PROOF. Suppose that at some stage, an explanation ρ 2 obtained when recognizing an order O ρ,1 contains more than |A| states from which some cycle β coming from a silent connected component can be appended. In other words, ρ 2 is an explanation for paths of the form ρ = ρ 2,1 .ρ 2,2 . . . . ρ 2,k , where occurrence of a cycle can be inserted between each pair ρ 2,i , ρ 2,i+1 . As it is of size greater than A, ρ necessarily contains a cycle. As inserting β is optional to explain O ρ,1 , we know that inserting the contents of this cycle does not change the set of observed events or causalities; that is, O β is an LPO that is completely concurrent with O ρ . However, if β commutes with elements of a path of size greater than |A|, then A is not locally synchronized. So, all possible insertions of cycles in an acyclic explanation can occur between transitions of a path located in a suffix of this path of size at most |A|. Hence, there are fewer than |A| silent cycles in any explanation. Now in a given path ρ of A 2 , if the i th occurrence of an event in a particular order O j is marked, then the preceding occurrences are also marked. As we do not add any transition to pruned path sequences that end with unmarked order (otherwise, these sequences would not be minimal) in a path of size greater than |A| 2 .max, where max is the size of the largest order in A 2 , there is necessarily a sequence of transitions carrying only marked events. Hence, there is only a finite number of configurations for subsequences describing the yet unexplained part of a path followed in A 1 and the matching paths of A 2 . So, the algorithm terminates. PROOF. If H is locally synchronized, then for any cycle ρ and pair of events e, f in
As O V is simply a projection, for any pair of events with labels in V , We then have the obvious following corollary: COROLLARY 5.4. Non-interference is decidable for locally synchronized HMSCs.
LOCAL AND CAUSAL NON-INTERFERENCE
We now turn to other types of decidable classes, related to regularity. Indeed, inclusion problems become decidable as soon as one can recast the order comparison problem in a regular setting. It is, however, undecidable whether an HMSC or a partial order automaton has a regular behavior, and one has to rely on syntactic subclasses of the models such as locally synchronized HMSCs/POA as earlier to obtain decidability. We show in this section that several HMSC observation functions describing the discriminating power of a single process always define sets of orders that can be recognized by finite (word) automata, regardless of the characteristics of the considered HMSC. In this restricted setting, it is then possible to decide whether a process p ∈ P can detect occurrences of confidential actions. As HMSCs explicitly specify distribution of actions on processes, exhibiting the behavior of a fixed process within an HMSC specification is an easy task. In this section, we show that this local setting allows for the definition of two decidable notions of non-interference.
Local Interference
Considering the attacker of a system as a single process p ∈ P, with action labels in some alphabet p = α(E p ), we should assume that process p does not execute confidential actions, that is, C ∩ p = ∅. In a similar way, the observation power of a single process should be restricted to its own events; hence, we can safely set 
that is, checking if no causal consequence of a confidential action is located on process p. Recast in the setting of MSC coloring, this amounts to checking that p is not marked with a black token. As explained in Section 3.3, this can be performed in linear time. We can now look at local interference for HMSCs:
Definition 6.1. Let H be an HMSC over a set of processes P, over alphabet = V C N. Let p ∈ P be a process and p be the alphabet of actions located on process
Intuitively, local interference holds when an observer cannot distinguish in F H behaviors that are concatenations of MSCs containing no confidential event and other behaviors. Consider HMSC H in Figure 10 . H is interferent according to Definition 6.1, as observation of ?m or ?n on process p differentiates executions with/without confidential event c. However, no event on p is a causal consequence of c.
PROPOSITION 6.2. For every HMSC H and every process p ∈ P, one can build a (partial order) automaton A H,O p that recognizes
PROOF (SKETCH). For any H, we can build a finite automaton A p (H) that recognizes (linearizations of) projections of all MSCs in F H on p. As concatenation of MSCs imposes a total order on events of the same process, these projections are concatenations of finite sequences of events (local projections of MSCs along transitions of H). Hence, A p (H) has transitions using labels of events located on process p and just needs to remember the transition of H that is recognized (the current MSC under execution) and a bounded integer symbolizing the last event of the current MSC executed by p. , and checking local interference resumes to inclusion of the languages of these automata (whence the complexity in PSPACE). For the hardness part, we can also show that any regular language inclusion problem can be encoded as a local interference problem.
Local interference is decidable and describes a situation where a process can discover that the running execution of the system contains or will contain a confidential action. Consider, for instance, the HMSC of Figure 3 with C = {g} and its observation on process r. Any execution containing an event with label i reveals occurrence of MSC M 4 , and hence the possibility that g has occurred or will occur. However, local interference does not distinguish between a situation where an observation is a causal consequence of some confidential action and a situation where observation and confidential action highlighted by the interference are concurrent. This drawback also occurs in standard language-based interference settings, where causality is represented as interleaving, and one cannot decide whether in a word c.v actions c (confidential) and v (visible) are concurrent or not.
Causal Interference
We first give a concrete example showing that leaking information in a causal order context may give opportunities for focused security attacks when the confidential event that is detected lays within the causal past of some observation. Nowadays, a lot of attention is devoted to privacy. However, it is well known that users spread a lot of information to visited sites when browsing the web. This information is not always local information (cookies, cache, etc.) that can be erased by users if needed. It can also be information stored elsewhere on the web: logs, forms, and so forth. When observation of a causal consequence of a confidential action (Mr. X has bought a book on commercial site Y ) by an attacker indicates that a confidential operation has occurred, this may also mean that classified information might be available at some vulnerable site (the credit card details of X are stored somewhere on Y 's website). Hence, characterizing interference where confidential actions and observations are causally related is important. Hence, H is causally interferent. Now, consider HMSC H . The projection of executions on process p is the language (?m+?n) * .?m.?n * . Upon reception of message m followed by two messages n on process p, one cannot decide whether action c occurred or not. HMSC H is not causally interferent. Last, HMSC H is not causally interferent (there is no causal dependency from c to any other event in executions of H ), but it is locally interferent (as defined in Definition 6.1).
In the rest of this section, we propose a decidable notion of causal interference (still with respect to a fixed attacker p ∈ P). It emphasizes causal dependencies between confidential and visible actions of the system. Bearing in mind that a black event located on process p is a consequence of a confidential event, we show that causal dependencies can be discovered by maintaining in states of an HMSC the information on black/white tokens attached to processes. We want to check if a process p can detect whether some confidential action has occurred in the causal past of its observed events. In other words, we have to check whether all projections on p of an execution of H that contains a black event only have equivalent projections that do not contain black events.
Definition 6.5. For an HMSC H and a process p ∈ P, H is causally non-interferent with respect to p if for every MSC M in F H such that M contains a black event on process p, there exists another MSC M in F H such that:
• M contains no black event on process p, and
According to Definition 6.5, HMSC H in Figure 10 is causally interferent and HMSC H is not. THEOREM 6.6. For a fixed set of processes P, deciding causal non-interference of an HMSC H with respect to a process p ∈ P is PSPACE-complete.
We prove this theorem in several steps. We first use the result of Proposition 3.6, that is, the fact that black/white coloring of processes at the end of a sequence of concatenated MSCs can be done by remembering the status of processes after each MSC. This property holds for MSCs built along paths of HMSCs and is used (in Proposition 6.7) to build HMSCs that recognize MSCs in F H after which a fixed process is black (or similarly remains white). These HMSCs contain nodes of H but remember for each node n whether processes are black or white after an MSC is built along a path ending in n. Then causal interference is reduced to an inclusion problem of finite automata that recognize sequences of actions along a process. PROPOSITION 6.7. Let H be an HMSC, p ∈ P, and = C V N. Then, one can build:
• PROOF (SKETCH). The nodes of the HMSCs built in the proof memorize a node of the original HMSC, to which is added information on the color of each process: according to Proposition 3.6, this is the only information needed to remember the color of all processes in an MSC M ρ assembled along a path ρ of H. The HMSC is furthermore equipped with accepting nodes that require p to be black in H B, p and white
. Then, using again the construction illustrated in Figure 7 , we consider MSC M c that contains one confidential event on some fresh process P c ∈ P, followed by messages from P c to all processes in P, and at last, an HMSC H that contains all transitions, nodes, and accepting nodes of H 1 , H 2 , an initial node n 0 , and an additional transition t 1 = (n 0 , M c , n 1 0 ). Any path of H starting with transition t 1 generates an MSC in which p is black, and whose projection on p is in L 1 . Other paths that do not start with t 1 generate MSCs from F H 2 , and in particular MSCs in which p is white and whose projection on p is in L 2 . Hence, H is causally interferent with respect to p if and only if L 1 ⊆ L 2 .
Causal interference can be checked in space in O(log(|H|) + |P| + |H|.2 |P| ). This space complexity is polynomial in the size of the HMSC and exponential in the number of processes, but HMSC specifications are usually defined for small sets of processes. Also remark that as soon as V = p , we can easily reuse the construction of H W, p to get a
DECLASSIFICATION
Non-interference considers confidential information as secrets that should remain undisclosed along all runs of a system. This point of view is too strict to be of practical interest: in many cases, confidentiality of a secret action has a limited duration and secrets can be downgraded. Consider the following example: a user wants to buy an item online and pays by sending his or her credit card information. Everything from this transaction between the online shop and the buyer (even if encryption is used) should remain secret. Within this setting, all payment steps should be considered confidential, and flow from these actions to observable events should be prevented. However, if a buyer uses a one-time credit card (i.e., a virtual credit card number generated on request that can be used only once for a transaction), then all information on the card is valueless as soon as the payment is completed. Hence, after completing the transaction, learning that a payment occurred is harmless and the sequence of interactions implementing a secured online payment need not be kept secret. This declassification possibility was first proposed as conditional interference by Goguen and Meseguer [1982] and later defined in Rushby [1992] as intransitive interference. INI can be formulated as follows: for any run of the system containing a confidential action that is not downgraded subsequently, there is a run with no classified action (all confidential actions are downgraded), which is equivalent from the observer's point of view. Usually, INI is defined using a pruning function that removes from a run all confidential actions that are not declassified and compares observations of pruned and normal runs (see Gorrieri and Vernali [2011] for a definition of INI on transition systems). From now on, we assume that the alphabet = C V N contains a particular subset D ⊆ V N of declassification events. Intuitively, declassification events downgrade all their confidential causal predecessors.
Definition 7.1. Let M be an MSC. An event e ∈ E M is classified if it is a confidential event (α(e) ∈ C), it has an observable successor v (α(v) ∈ V ), and it is not declassified before v; that is, there exists no
We can characterize INI in a single MSC M as a property depending on the causal order in M and on the sets of confidential, declassification, and observable events. 
This proposition means that a declassification must occur between every confidential event and a causally related visible event. We now define observation functions for HMSCs that consider declassification and propose a definition of intransitive noninterference for HMSCs. We define
We follow the definition of Gorrieri and Vernali [2011] 
This proposition can be intuitively seen as a property of causal chains. Recall that a causal chain from c to v is a sequence of events c ≤ e 1 ≤ . . . e n ≤ v. We say that a chain from c to v is declassified if α(e i ) ∈ D for some i ∈ 1..n. Then an MSC is INI if for any pair (c, v) of confidential/visible events such that c ≤ v, there exists at least one declassified causal chain from c to v. If so, the confidential event c is guaranteed to be declassified by the occurrence of some declassifying action before the execution of v occurs.
A causal chain from c to v in M 1 • M 2 can be decomposed into a chain from c to the maximal event f on a process q in M 1 , a causal ordering from f to a minimal event f located on process q in M 2 coming from the sequential composition of M 1 and M 2 , and then a causal chain from the minimal event f on q to v. However, one does not need to know precisely the contents of M 1 to decide whether M 1 • M 2 is INI. It suffices to remember for each process p the confidential events of M 1 that are not yet declassified and are predecessors of the maximal event executed by process p in M 1 .
On the example depicted in Figure 11 , MSC M 1 (left) contains three confidential actions c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , and a declassification operation d. On the right, MSC M 2 contains three visible actions v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , and a declassification operation d. All other events belong to α −1 (N). Both MSCs are INI, since no observation depends on a confidential action in M 1 or in M 2 . However, in the concatenation M 1 • M 2 , execution of v 1 or v 2 reveals the occurrence of c 2 . Also note that c 1 is declassified by the first occurrence of d in M 1 . This example is particularly interesting, as it shows that in order to abstract an arbitrarily long execution, it is not sufficient to remember a Boolean value indicating whether there exists a not-yet-declassified action on a process, as two confidential events on the same process can be declassified by different causal chains. Indeed, some confidential actions could be declassified for a process, while some others could not, even when located on the same process.
We can characterize II MSCs in a set F H by remembering at each step of a sequence of MSCs only a finite set of shapes of causal chains. In order to define these shapes, let M be an MSC, and let c be a confidential event in M. We define a function cl(c, M) : i) there exists a process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = +, and for every pair of events e ≤ f in M 2 such that e is minimal on q and f is maximal on process p, no causal chain from e to f is declassified, ii) for every process q = q, if cl(c, M 1 )(q ) = +, no declassified causal chain from an event on q to an event f on p exists in M 2 , iii) for every process q = q, if cl(c, M 1 )(q ) = then no causal chain from an event on q to an event f on p exists in M 2 .
cl(c, M 1 • M 2 )(p) = if one of the following conditions hold:
i) cl(c, M 1 )( p) = , or ii) there exist a process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = + and a declassified chain from an event e located on process q to an event f located on process p, or iii) there exist a process q such that cl(c, M 1 )(q) = , and a causal chain from an event e located on process q to an event f located on process p.
Last, cl(c, M 1 • M 2 )(p) = ⊥ if cl(c, M 1 )( p) = ⊥ and M 2 does not contain a pair of events e ≤ f such that e is located on q with cl(c, M 1 )(q) = ⊥, and f is located on p. memorizes a node n of H; a Boolean b, indicating whether an interference has been detected; and a set X = {cl 1 , . . . cl ) ⊆ Cl, where each cl i is a function from P to {⊥, +, } that memorizes the shape of causal chains from a confidential event to maximal events on processes. H II follows transitions of H and updates cl i s. For each new confidential event c occurring of a low-level one, and conflict places, where firing a high-level transition inhibits the firing of a low-level one. Reachability of causal or conflict places is shown equivalent to BNDC (Bisimulation-based NDC, the variant of non-interference using bisimulation instead of language equality). In Gorrieri and Vernali [2011] , the notion of intransitive non-interference from Rushby [1992] is revisited for transition systems, and non-interference with downgraders is considered for elementary nets. A structural characterization is given in terms of reachable causal and conflict places. As in Busi and Gorrieri [2009] , causal and conflict places are characterized in terms of possible fireable sequences of transitions, hence considering the interleaving semantics of the net. Best et al. [2010] study (B)NDC and INI for unbounded labeled Petri nets and extend their results to selective declassification in Best and Darondeau [2012] . They obtain decidability of these properties for injectively labeled nets by a very clever exploitation of specific decidability results for language inclusion, which is undecidable for general Petri net languages. The characterization relies on sequences of transitions, and not on causal properties of nets.
A contrario, Baldan and Carraro [2014] emphasize the fact that characterizing BNDC in terms of structural conditions expressing causality or conflict between high-and lowlevel transitions is a way to provide efficient algorithms to check interference. They propose a definition of complete unfolding w.r.t. non-interference and reduce BNDC for safe nets to check that a complete unfolding is weak conflict and weak causal place free. Weak causal places characterize dependencies and conflicts between high and low transitions. Their results show that interference can be detected in concurrent models without relying on interleaving semantics. They only hold for safe nets, that is, for finite state systems.
Conclusion.
We proposed a partial order framework for information flow properties analysis, which relies on comparisons of sets of partial orders describing observations of system executions. We proved that inclusion of observed orders and non-interference is undecidable in general. To alleviate this problem, we proposed partial order automata as a model to recognize observations of executions. We then identified subclasses of partial order automata for which language inclusion is decidable. Locally synchronized HMSCs fall into this category, and hence non-interference is decidable in this subclass. A different approach to obtain decidability in this partial order framework is to restrict the kind of observation functions that can be used. This is a sensible approach, as it amounts to restricting the power of attackers. When visible events are observed by a single process of the system, most of the observation functions applied to HMSCs define regular languages. As a consequence, several notions of local non-interference and their extensions with declassification are decidable. We showed that local versions of non-interference are PSPACE-complete problems and give decision procedures that never compute the interleaving semantics of the original HMSC.
So far, partial order automata are mainly used as an intermediate technicality to prove the decidability of non-interference for locally synchronized HMSCs when several processes can be observed in a system. However, this model is more general than HMSCs. A possible refinement of the landscape is to consider the decidability of interference for partial order automata that generate sets of orders with nonregular linearization languages. We conjecture that the decidability of inclusion can be generalized to some subclasses of nonregular partial order automata, some classes of graph grammars, or more generally subclasses of models with bounded-split width [Aiswarya et al. 2014] .
Another line of research is to consider stronger information flow properties in HMSCs. We have shown that local interference is weaker than causal interference, and that declassification allows finer definitions of information leakage. To overcome weakness of language-based information flow characterizations, the notion of NDC (Nondeducibility on Composition) was proposed to detect when confidential actions cause observable effects. Informally, NDC says that a system S composed with any machine R (that enables/forbids confidential events) is observationally equivalent to S. At first glance, causal non-interference appears weaker than a causal form of NDC: it compares the observations of an HMSC with the observations that are still possible without confidential events. With respect to this definition, it is the comparison of the behavior of a specification controlled by one machine that prevents all confidential events. In contrast, NDC compares a behavior of a specification with the behaviors of the same specification controlled by every possible high-level mechanism, which can prevent some confidential events from occurring. Hence, specifications that are not causally interferent may nevertheless disclose information when controlled by other machines. So defining a causal form of NDC for HMSCs along the lines sketched in Baldan and Carraro [2014] is an appealing task.
Finally, we could consider security issues when an attacker can interact with the system in order to gain information (active interference) or when he or she can get information on the current configuration of the system (state-based interference). Extending definitions of information flows in HMSCs to quantify the amount of information disclosure by mean of measures (e.g., probability measures, average number of bits leaked per action, etc.) is also a challenging perspective.
